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Abstract 
Are property rights obtained through legally dubious means forever tainted with original sin or can 
rightholders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works?
2   This is a critical question 
for developing countries (and Russia in particular) where privatization is often opaque and 
businesspeople may receive property, but remain unwilling to use it productively due to concerns 
about the vulnerability of their rights to political challenge.   Using a survey of 660 businesspeople 
conducted in Russia in February 2005, I find that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult 
to expunge.   Businesspeople, however, can improve the perceived legitimacy of property rights by 
doing good works, such as investing in the firm and by providing public goods for the region.  
Finally, managers that provide public goods for their region are more likely to invest in their firms 
than those who did not. The finding that public goods providers invest at higher rates is at odds 
with standard economic logic, but fits well with the more political view of property rights developed 
here. These findings have implications for political economy and contemporary Russia. 
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The task that I have set before the government is to make the reforms irreversible. 
Boris Yeltsin, October 1991. 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has told leading Russian businessmen he does not 
want a reversal of privatization.  
BBC July 28, 2000 
  
Putin against reversal of privatization. 
      Headline Interfax New Agency, September 26, 2003 
 
I am a categorical opponent of a review of the results of privatization. 
    Vladimir Putin, Italian News Agency, November 5, 2003 
 
Any allegations that Russia is preparing to revise the privatization results are 
groundless.   
Vladimir Putin, RFE/RL, April 11, 2005. 
 
  
Are property rights obtained through legally dubious means forever tainted with original sin 
or can rightholders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works?  Does compliance 
with privatization laws influence subsequent perceptions of the legitimacy of property rights? Or are 
people willing to let bygones be bygones a decade later?  
Answers to these questions have ramifications well beyond academic debate.   Over the last 
twenty years privatization has become a central component of economic transformation in 
developing and transition countries.  Based on the expectation that, other things equal, private 
ownership generates stronger incentives to produce than does state ownership, policymakers and 
international financial institutions have advised governments from Asia to Africa to transfer their 
state-owned assets to private hands.   However, the potential gains from privatization may not be 
realized if the property rights are viewed as insecure.  To the extent that these privatization 
outcomes are seen as illegitimate by the broader community, rightholders may view their property 
rights as vulnerable to challenge by politicians seeking to mobilize popular support against the 
“plunder of our country’s natural wealth.” Such populist challenges to privatization are a staple of 2 
politics in developing and transition countries as illustrated most starkly by the recent case of 
YUKOS in Russia.  In general, where rightholders view their rights as vulnerable to political 
challenge, they are unlikely to use their assets productively, and privatization may produce few 
benefits for society and for the firm.  
Using an experiment embedded in an original survey of 660 businesspeople in Russia 
conducted in February 2005, this essay develops three theories that explore the conditions under 
which property rights come to be seen as legitimate.  It asks whether the severity of violations of the 
Law on Privatization shapes perceptions of the legitimacy of property rights.  This “original sin” 
argument suggests that property rights transferred via significant violations of the law retain their 
illegitimacy well into the future.   
It also asks whether recipients of privatized assets can increase the perceived legitimacy of 
their property rights by investing in their firm or by providing public goods for the community.  
This argument suggests that businesspeople can make their ill-gotten gains more legitimate by doing 
“good works.”    
In addition, it explores the economic consequences of doing “good works.”  It argues that 
rightholders may use the provision of public goods to make their rights less vulnerable to political 
attack, and therefore more secure.  This logic predicts that firms that provide public goods for the 
region will invest at higher rates – a prediction at odds with conventional economic reasoning. 
These analyses shift the study of property rights from institutional factors to the strategies of 
rightholders themselves.  Most studies focus on the degree to which businesspeople expect their 
rights to be respected under different institutional arrangements.  Scholars have developed an 
impressive body of literature that analyzes the impact of formal institutions (courts, police, and 
regime-type) and informal institutions (trust, social capital and networks) on property rights.
3   These 
are important issues, but do not examine how rightholders themselves may take matters into their 
own hands to strengthen the legitimacy and, ultimately, the security of their property rights.   
Similarly, much existing literature takes the initial distribution of property rights as given and 
does not explore how the origins of particular distributions of property rights may influence their 
future legitimacy.  This is a critical question in developing and transition countries where 
privatization is rarely conducted with attention to legal niceties.  Privatization is an inherently messy 
process that gives politicians considerable leeway to reward friends and punish enemies and 
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therefore it is no surprise that the public typically views privatization with great skepticism.  But 
having transferred state assets in a less than transparent fashion, what, if anything, can governments 
and individuals do to make these property rights more broadly accepted in the community?   
Research on the question is scant.    
This study also provides new data on relations between business and the state in a transition 
economy.   Our understanding of property rights in Russia is often unduly colored by high-profile 
conflicts over property which may blind us to the subtle and slow moving changes in property rights 
that occur largely outside of public view.   This essay gathers the insights of a randomly selected 
group of businesspeople with the hope of gaining a more balanced picture of the current state of 
property rights in Russia. It also helps to place the ongoing debate over the reversal privatization in 
Russia in context. 
 
Background 
Property rights are the bundle of rights that include the power to use, transfer, and generate 
income from assets, including land, labor, and capital (Barzel 1989: 2).   Much economic reasoning 
suggests that where rightholders assume the full cost and benefits of their actions, they use their 
assets most efficiently and generate greater welfare gains for all.  Societies that use their property 
rights more efficiently enjoy higher rates of growth and greater prosperity (North and Thomas 
1973).  That private ownership generates stronger incentives to produce than does state ownership 
provides the economic justification for many types of privatization.
4   
Discussions of privatization often treat property rights as unproblematic.  It is often 
implicitly assumed that having received legal title, rightholders will put those assets to their most 
productive use.  However, the transfer of rights from state to private hands is only a first step in 
encouraging rightholders to use their assets productively.  The state, through its monopoly on the 
use of coercion, retains its ability to redraw property rights in a variety of ways, from expropriation 
and renationalization to changes in regulation and tax policy.  Having received their assets through 
privatization, rightholders who expect the state to alter their rights in the future have weak 
incentives to use their assets productively.  As made clear in the quotes by President Putin that begin 
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empirical evidence tends to favor private ownership. See Djankov and Murrell (2002) for a review of empirical studies 
from the postcommunist world. 4 
this essay, the political threat that privatization may be reversed can loom large even years after 
assets have been transferred from state to private hands. 
This threat is far from hypothetical.  This year alone governments from Ukraine to Bolivia 
and Zimbabwe have changed or threatened to change the terms under which property rights were 
transferred to private rightholders.
5  Most prominently, the YUKOS affair in which the Russian state 
ultimately seized assets privatized in 1996 from the largest private oil company in the country 
highlights the politically contingent nature of privatization.
6 These ex post changes in the 
distribution of assets may redress past injustices where privatization was widely perceived to have 
been corrupt, but they also raise uncertainty about whether other transfers of property will suffer a 
similar fate.  A primary concern inherent in reversing privatization is that the process will snowball 
and undermine property rights more generally (Sonin 2003).   
The threat of reversing privatization may be heightened where existing definitions of 
property rights are perceived as illegitimate by the community.  Where property rights are not 
broadly accepted, political entrepreneurs can bolster their standing by railing against the current 
distribution of property rights.  In such situations, privatization is likely to produce few benefits as 
existing rightholders anticipate future limitations on their rights.  In contrast, such appeals are likely 
to fall on deaf ears should the community view property rights as broadly acceptable and thereby 
allow rightholders to invest with confidence that their rights are less likely to be challenged.   Thus, 
the extent to which property rights are broadly accepted by the community (e.g., legitimate), has a 
direct bearing on the security of property rights and, ultimately, on whether or not those assets are 
used productively. 
  Concerns about the legitimacy of industrial privatization have special importance in the 
postcommunist world where the scope and speed of de-etatization has been unprecedented.  Having 
inherited massive state sectors and facing pressure from international financial institutions to 
privatize, incumbent politicians had vast opportunities to deliver assets to their political supporters 
in a less than transparent fashion.   Perhaps no policy in the postcommunist world is the subject of 
more general opprobrium.  Janusz Lewandowski, former Minister of Ownership in Transformation 
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in Poland, famously captured the inherently murky nature of privatization in the postcommunist 
world when he noted: “Privatization is when someone who does not know who the real owner is 
and does not know what it is really worth sells something to someone who does not have any 
money” (Verdery 1996: 210).  Given the circumstances it is hardly surprising that state officials who 
missed out on the bounty of the initial round of privatization have tried to mobilize political support 
around perceived injustices committed by their predecessors.  With a nod to Trotsky’s cry of 
“permanent revolution,” Hellman (2002) and Sonin (2003) refer to this process as “permanent 
redistribution.” 
This more political treatment of property rights brings to the fore aspects of privatization 
that have received less attention in the literature.  First, it suggests the importance of gauging the 
acceptance of existing definitions of property rights in the broader community as a determinant of 
property rights.  Studies of property rights often focus on the perceptions of individual rightholders 
about their property.   However, whether the state challenges existing property rights and whether 
those challenges are successful is likely to be influenced by how well those property rights are 
accepted in the community.   Thus, it is useful to shift the analysis to perceptions about property 
rights more generally. 
Second, rather than viewing property rights in a static fashion as protected by law, this 
interpretation suggests that property rights are continually redefined through political competition.   
Political challenges to existing property rights are likely to be more successful where the initial 
transfer of rights is seen as illegitimate.  Moreover, as rightholders may anticipate that the rights they 
receive are politically vulnerable, they may be more likely to strip these assets than use them 
productively.  Far from being fixed in law, property rights are highly dependent on the political 
climate. 
Third, this conception of property rights leads to the counterintuitive proposition that firms 
that provide public goods for the region should invest at higher rates.  A straightforward economic 
argument would suggest that a ruble spent on public goods is a ruble not available for investment.  
Thus, the provision of public goods should lead to lower levels of investment.  In the view 
developed here, however, firms that provide public goods should feel more secure in their property 
and, therefore, be more likely to invest. 6 
This work also differs from many empirical studies of property rights.
7  There is a small, but 
growing literature using survey experiments that seeks to establish how different distributions of 
property rights influence behavior, but these studies rarely address privatization directly and have 
not been conducted in the postcommunist world (Duch and Palmer 2004). Surveys of 
businesspeople in the postcommunist and developing world have addressed similar themes and 
produced important insights (c.f., Frye and Shleifer 1996; Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman, 1997; 
1999; 2000; Shliefer and Vishny 1998; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 1999, 2000; Hellman, 
Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000; Frye 2004). These works, however, focus on institutional, social, or 
political factors rather than how the process of transferring property or the actions of rightholders 
themselves influence perceptions of property rights.  Scholars have produced a rich literature on the 
cross-national determinants of the security of property rights, but these works are less well suited for 
addressing the questions at hand as they focus neither on the perceptions of individuals or the 
effects of the origins of property rights (c.f., Knack and Keefer 1995; Kaufmann 1999; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2003).   
In sum, many works have explored the consequences of privatization, but few have 
examined how property rights come to be seen as legitimate by the community (c.f. North and 
Thomas 1973; Besley and Coates 1995; Djankov and Murrell 2002).  In addition, existing literature 
rarely explores whether the legality of the privatization process itself influences subsequent 
perceptions of property rights or whether the actions of rightholders post-privatization can improve 
the legitimacy of property rights. These aspects of property rights have been understudied despite 
their importance for policy and social science. 
 
Importance for the Russian Case 
This salience of privatization as a political issue remains high in many parts of the world, but 
perhaps nowhere is this concern more timely than in Russia.  In the Yeltsin years, big business and 
the state sought to balance the exchange of political support for economic benefits while avoiding a 
populist backlash that would threaten both.
8  President Putin came to power with the backing of 
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some members of big business who saw him as willing to continue the policies of his predecessor, 
but Putin’s unexpected rise in popularity allowed him to build a base of political support 
independent of big business.  This popularity gave him leverage over his former backers, and shortly 
after coming to office, he began to chip away the power of individual big businessmen – many of 
whom had grown wealthy off privatization deals of dubious legality.
9 With the transfer of power to 
President Putin, privatization deals conducted by previous administrations received renewed 
attention. 
Most importantly, the arrest of YUKOS executives Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorksky 
in 2003 on a variety of charges including violations of the Law on Privatization brought this issue 
sharply into focus.   Among other charges, the two men were accused of underinvesting in the 
Apatit fertilizer plant whose privatization was conditional upon the owners meeting investment 
targets.  Ironically, both men were eventually found guilty on charges related to this privatization, 
but the judge ruled that the statute of limitations had expired in this case.  They were sentenced 
based on findings of guilt on numerous other charges.  The economic and political fallout from this 
affair has been hotly debated.
10   
                                                           
9 Of course, wealth redistribution continued after privatization as groups grown powerful from their control over former 
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10 The issue has reinforced cleavages within the Russian political elite, but also generated an unusual and temporary 
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of the liberal Union of Right Forces noted: "A re-examination [of privatization results] is the way toward confrontation, 
toward pumping money out of one business structure into the pocket of another. It means capital flight, the loss of 
millions of work places and plunging the country into poverty." (Interfax)  In a rare show of unity (or at least the lack of 
open disagreement) with the liberals, the head of the Communist Party of the Russia Federation was also critical of the 
Putin Administration’s handling of the affair.  Gennady Zyuganov described actions undertaken against YUKOS, as 
"barbaric" and noted that prosecutors were "doing a great disservice to all Russian citizens".   Of course, his views may 8 
President Putin appears to recognize the explosiveness of the issue and has tried to walk a 
fine line that balances the political benefits of soaking the nouveaux-riches against the economic 
costs of capital flight, heightened uncertainty, and reduced investment.  As noted in the quotes that 
begin this essay, President Putin has repeatedly stated his position that the effects of privatization 
should not be reviewed. That he has had to repeat this position for five years running indicates, 
however, that he has had little success in convincing the public of his sincerity. 
11  
 
Three Theories 
This essay develops three arguments about the extent to which property rights obtained 
through privatization become accepted by the community.   
Original Sin.  The “original sin” argument suggests that the manner in which property is 
transferred from state to private hands influences perceptions of the legitimacy of property rights.  
Former state-owned assets obtained through serious illegality acquire a birth defect that is long-
lasting and impervious to treatment.  Property rights that are broadly seen as ill-gotten may provoke 
uncertainty among rightholders who fear future revisions of their rights due to changes in the 
political environment. 
The “original sin” argument suggests that the designers of privatization policy should pay 
considerable attention to crafting means by which the outcome is seen as legitimate.  Absent broad 
acceptance of the procedures by which assets are privatized, transferring property rights from state 
to private hands may produce few benefits.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
have been colored by the sizable campaign funds that many believe the Communist Party received from Khodorkovsky 
and YUKOS.   
11 President Putin has further insisted that not all privatization deals violated existing law.  In a December 2003 speech 
before the largest business lobby in Russia he noted: “We often hear that laws were complicated and impossible to 
comply with. These are the statements of those who did not observe them. This is rubbish. Those who wanted to 
observe the law did so.”  More ominously, he added that “if five or seven people did not observe the law it does not 
mean that everybody did the same.”  This quote sparked a widespread guessing game about which leading businessmen 
would be the next to suffer the fate of Khodorkovsky.   These remarks reflect the tension that confronts President 
Putin. Criticizing the manner in which privatization was conducted is politically advantageous, but threatens the 
economy. 9 
The case at hand provides a hard test for the “original sin” argument.  Most privatizations in 
Russia took place a decade ago and memories of the gory details of the initial bargain may have 
dimmed.  In addition, the role of the market as a means for allocating goods is better understood 
and more broadly accepted today than it was a decade ago.  Moreover, many have noted that formal, 
written law in Russia is not held in wide respect.   
Echoing Coase (1960), the counter argument suggests that the initial distribution of property 
rights is relatively unimportant provided that rightholders are not prevented from exchanging their 
rights in the marketplace.  This view seems to have been closest to that held by the advocates of 
rapid privatization who oversaw the process in Russia.  While not condoning illegality, these leaders 
were most concerned with transferring property rights as quickly as possible with the hope that 
rightholders would provide a base of political support and eventually assets would reach the most 
efficient users.  One observer reported that the state official in charge of privatization in Russia, 
Anatolii Chubais, told him the following about managers in Russia: “They steal and steal and steal. 
They are stealing absolutely everything and it is impossible to stop them.  But let them steal and take 
their property. They will then become owners and decent administrators of this property” (Freeland 
2000: 70). 
The “original sin” argument focuses primarily on the behavior of government, rather than 
the rightholders, as an influence on property rights.  It also devotes attention to the initial transfer of 
property rights rather than the subsequent use of those rights as key determinants of the legitimacy 
of property rights.  The next set of arguments puts greater attention on how rightholders themselves 
can take steps to increase the perceived legitimacy of property rights after the initial privatization by 
doing “good works.” The argument comes in two versions. 
Good Works 1.0.  The private goods view of the “good works” argument suggests that the 
perceived security of property rights depends on how the managers have used the resource granted 
to them by the state.   If a manager has modernized and restructured the firm, then others may be 
willing to view the property rights as legitimate even if the assets were obtained by cutting legal 
corners. This argument is often made by Russian business elites who seek to justify their wealth by 
pointing to the success of their firms in creating jobs and promoting growth.   The good use of the 
asset generates its own justification for initial privatization outcomes.  This argument suggests that 
managers can use their own actions to legitimate their property.  If this view is correct, then policy 
should be directed toward encouraging rightholders to modernize and restructure their companies 10 
after privatization.  Doing so could help others to view the distribution of property rights as more 
legitimate. 
Good Works 2.0.  The public goods version of the “good works” argument suggests that 
managers who provide many public goods for the region may generate greater respect for their 
property rights.  As the Robber-Barons in the 19
th century United States tried to legitimate their 
gains by spending portions of their wealth on public goods and charitable giving, one might expect a 
similar process to be underway in Russia.   Indeed, in recent years, the oligarchs of Russia have 
mimicked this strategy to some degree by sponsoring opera performances, rock concerts, museum 
exhibitions, ballet companies, and a variety of religious and social organizations.
12  They have created 
think-tanks that analyze social and economic problems.  In addition, they have contributed directly 
to a range of social projects from scholarship funds to summer camps and hospitals.
13   
The movement is in its early days, but goes beyond the oligarchs.   The Putin government 
has made corporate social responsibility an important theme and encouraged firms across the 
country to find ways to help provide critical services to their local communities.  In addition, the 
largest lobby for big business in Russia, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs has 
adopted corporate social responsibility as a key slogan and developed a variety of plans to encourage 
businesses to provide social goods.  Much of these efforts remain at the level of public relations, but 
there is little doubt that many Russian businesses are trying to use good works to polish their public 
images.  
The notion that firms should support social services in their surrounding communities is 
hardly a new one in Russia.  During the Soviet period, enterprises provided a wide range of social 
services for their workers and the local population. Given this history there is perhaps a greater 
expectation that firms should provide public goods in Russia than is the case in other settings.   The 
public goods version of the good works argument suggests that rightholders can legitimate their 
property rights by using their assets to provide benefits for all.  
The implications for policy in this instance are clear. To heighten the perceived legitimacy of 
their property rights, managers should provide more public goods for their communities.  The costs 
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http://www.interros.ru/eng/human/.  Interros is a prominent funder of the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg. 
13 For information on charitable deeds of the large metals holding company, Evrasia-Holding, see, 
http://www.evrazholding.ru/ru/ecology/charity.  11 
of providing these public goods may be seen as insurance against a populist backlash that would 
threaten property rights. 
 
The Data 
To begin to investigate these and other arguments, I commissioned a survey of 660 company 
managers in 11 of Russia’s 89 regions, including at least one from each of Russia’s recently created 
“super-regions.”   The survey was conducted in January and February 2005 by the Levada Center, a 
Moscow-based polling firm with more than 15 years of experience.  Using data on the population of 
firms from the Russian State Statistical Agency and other sources, researchers stratified the sample 
by size and sector to mirror the population of firms in each region.  Firms from 23 sectoral 
classifications were included in the survey, with industry, construction, transportation, 
communications, finance and trade all represented.  Excluded from the sample were agricultural 
enterprises, communal services, health and social services.   Researchers selected firms at random 
from within each stratum so that each firm within each stratum had an equal probability of being 
included in the sample.  Only chief executive officers, chief financial officers, and chief legal officers 
were potential respondents and the selection rule followed the principle of “one interview, one 
firm.”     The distribution of firms in the sample roughly consistent with the national population.
14   
Most managers (79 percent) were male and the age of the average respondent was 47.  The 
mean number of workers in a firm in the sample was 727, and ranged from a minimum of 4 to a 
maximum of 70,000.   Half the firms in the sample had fewer than 125 workers and one quarter of 
the firms had less than 50 workers.  Twelve percent of firms were majority state-owned and 59 
percent had undergone some form of privatization.  Ownership concentration was high. In 49 
percent of the firms more than half of the shares were owned by a single stakeholder.  Only five 
percent of firms had foreign ownership. 
The interview subjects here are business elites and it would be inappropriate to generalize 
these views to the population at large.   Nonetheless, understanding the perceptions of business 
managers on these issues is important. First, they likely have given these issues considerable thought 
and should have fairly reasoned views on the matters at hand. Second, they are opinion leaders who 
likely exercise some sway over how the public perceives these issues.   Indeed, the silence and 
servility of other leaders of big business in the YUKOS case spoke volumes.  Third, they are a 
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diverse group that includes managers across the country with vastly different experiences and their 
perceptions are valuable in their own right.    When compared to the mass public, one might 
speculate that business elites would express less concern for abiding by the legal niceties of 
privatization and give themselves more credit for doing good works for the region.  The responses 
from businesspeople reported here should establish a lower bound for the “original sin” theory and 
an upper bound for the “good works” theories.     
To focus on the three theories highlighted above, the survey included a question with an 
experimental research design.
15  This technique randomly assigns one of several different versions of 
a question to a respondent.  Because the versions of the questions are distributed randomly, the 
responses should not be correlated with other factors that may be influencing the results, such as the 
type of firm or the personal characteristics of the respondent.   The differences in responses should 
only be attributed to the variables manipulated in the hypothetical scenarios.
16   S u r v e y - b a s e d  
experiments that manipulate different versions of the question  are a powerful method for analyzing 
survey responses at the aggregate level because they isolate the effects of the variables of interest – 
in this case the actions of rightholders and the perceived legitimacy of property rights.   
Table 1 describes an experiment used to assess the determinants of the perceived legitimacy 
of property rights obtained via privatization.
17  In line with the theories presented previously, the 
experiment manipulates the actions of rightholders by varying whether or not they have used their 
asset well and whether or not they provided public goods for their community.  In addition, it asked 
respondents to evaluate the legitimacy of property rights when violations of the law were minor and 
major.   The last question does not use an experimental research design and simply asks respondents 
two questions in succession.   
 
                                                           
15 See Green and Gerber (2002) for a primer on experiments. 
16 This method has the added advantage of avoiding statistical analyses that may rely on implausible assumptions. 
17 As managers are typically the largest shareholders in the firm, it is appropriate that they are responsible for the firm’s 
actions. 13 
A Survey Experiment on Privatization 
 
Let’s say that an industrial firm was privatized in the mid-1990s.    After privatization, the 
managers invested [little/a great deal] in the modernization and restructuring of their firm 
and they have also realized [no/many] social programs for the public in the region. 
 
If it turned out that the firm was privatized with minor  violations of the Law on 
Privatization, do you think that this matter should be turned over to the courts? 
    1) Yes    2) More or less Yes  3) More or Less No  4) No 
 
If it turned out that the firm was privatized with major  violations of the Law on 
Privatization, do you think that this matter should be turned over to the courts? 
    1) Yes    2) More or less Yes  3) More or Less No  4) No    
 
 
TABLE 1: Minor Violations of the Law on Privatization 
       
   
           Good Use of Asset      Bad Use of Asset 
 
Public Goods                  
Provided    22.8       33.5 
N = 145, 158       
 
No Public Goods            
P r o v i d e d     3 3 . 1      3 6 . 2  
N = 148, 152   
Cells report percent “Yes” or “More or Less Yes” responses. Yes indicates that the state court 
should review the privatization. Higher scores mean less legitimacy. 
N = number of responses for each version of the survey experiment. 
ANOVA Test: F(3, 592), = 7.63, p< .0001 
 14 
Table 1 presents the responses for scenarios in which violations of the Law on Privatization 
were only minor and varies the actions taken by the managers.
18  The upper left quadrant represents 
a best-case scenario. Here the manager used the asset well and provided many public goods for the 
region and violations of the Law on Privatization were minor.   In this instance only 22.8 percent of 
respondents agreed that the privatization should be reviewed by the state arbitration court.   
Now consider the responses in the upper right corner. In this case, the respondent received 
a scenario in which managers provided public goods for the community, but did not use their asset 
well.  Here 33.5 percent of managers said that the matter should be turned over to the arbitration 
courts.  This indicates a decrease in legitimacy of the privatization of almost 11 percent.  Thus, 
public goods provision can increase legitimacy. 
Consider the response in the lower left corner which report results from a scenario in which 
manager used the asset well, but did not provide public goods for the region.  In this case, 33.1 percent of 
the respondents agreed that the matter should be turned over to the arbitration court.  Again, this is strong 
support that the good use of an asset can make if more legitimate.    
Finally, consider the responses in the lower right corner.  In this scenario, respondents 
received the version of the question in which the manager neither used the asset well nor provided 
public goods for the region and the violations of the Law on Privatization were minor.  In this case, 
36.2 percent of respondents believed that that the matter should be turned over to the arbitration 
courts.   
  Doing neither type of “good works” increases the percentage of respondents who said that 
the matter should be reviewed from 22.8 to 36.2.  This marks a dramatic increase in the perceived 
legitimacy of property rights from previous scenarios.  It also suggests that a combination of a 
relatively well administered privatization program and good works on behalf of the manager can 
make property rights fairly legitimate even in the difficult setting of post-communist Russia.   
The next section provides a test of the “original sin” argument by comparing responses to 
questions on the severity of the violations of the Law on Privatization.  Respondents were asked the 
same questions as in the preceding example, but were asked to consider that the violations of the 
                                                           
18 One way to improve the experiment would be to randomly assign whether violations were major or minor.  Doing so 
would reduce the number of observations in each category and thereby make it more difficult to identify relationships 
with precision.  Given the novelty of embedding experiments in a survey in Russia, I took a conservative approach by 
only varying the types of “good works” in the experiment. 15 
Law on Privatization were major.  The responses in Table 2 reveal a roughly similar pattern.  Good 
works can improve the legitimacy of property rights and the effect is largest when good works are 
done in combination.   First, consider the responses in the lower right corner. Here we see a worst-
case scenario in which managers neither invested in the firm nor provided public goods for the 
region and privatization was conducted with major violations of the law.  In this scenario, 71.8 
percent of respondents agreed that the matter should be reviewed by the state arbitration court.  
Moving to the response in the upper right corner in which the manager provided public 
goods for the region, but did not invest in the firm indicates that 61.5 percent of respondents agree 
that the matter should be turned over to the state arbitration courts.    This is a significant reduction 
and suggests that even when privatization has been conducted with major illegalities, the provision 
of public goods can make property rights somewhat broadly accepted. 
The lower left corner presents a scenario in which managers invested in the firm, but did not 
provide any public goods for the region.  Here we see a marginal decline in the perceived legitimacy 
of property rights.  In this case, 69 percent of managers said that the privatization should be 
reviewed by the state arbitration court. 
Finally, the upper left quadrant presents results that offer strong support for the “good 
works” hypothesis, but again with an interesting twist.  Here respondents received a version of the 
question in which managers invested in the firm and provided public goods for the region. Although 
the privatization was conducted with major violations of the law, only 48 percent of managers 
agreed that the state arbitration court should review the matter.  As in Table 1, managers who both 
invested in their firms and provided public goods for the region dramatically increased the perceived 
legitimacy of their property rights.  16 
 
TABLE 2: Major Violations of the Law on Privatization 
 
   
         Good Use of Asset    Bad Use of Asset       
       
 
       
Public Goods                       
Provided            48.0        61.5 
N =150, 148         
 
 
No Public Goods                  
Provided            69.0        71.8 
N= 145, 149   
    
Cells report percent “Yes” or “More or Less Yes’ responses. Yes responses indicate that the state 
courts should review the privatization. Higher scores mean less legitimacy.  
N = number of responses for each version of the survey experiment. 
ANOVA test: f (3, 603) = 3.61, p< .01. 
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The next section provides a test of the “original sin” argument by comparing responses to 
the scenarios when violations of the Law on Privatization were minor and major.   Significant 
differences between these groups would indicate support for the “original sin” argument.  Table 3 
reports the sample means for the percent “yes” or “more less yes” responses for all scenarios when 
violations of the Law on Privatization were minor and when they were major.  The results indicate 
stark differences in the perceived legitimacy of property rights.  When violations of the Law on 
Privatization were minor, 31.5 percent of respondents in all four conditions responded that the 
privatization should be reviewed. The figure was almost twice as high (62.5 percent) when the 
violations of the Law on Privatization were major. 
Thus, there is a dramatic increase across categories in support for the review of privatization 
when the violations of the Privatization Law were major.  This indicates that the manner in which 
privatization is conducted has long-term effects on property rights.   Privatizations that are 
conducted with serious violations of the law are tainted by an original sin that is difficult to expunge. 
  
Table 3: Assessing the Original Sin Argument 
 
           Percent “Yes” or “More or Less Yes”  
        
 
     
M i n o r   V i o l a t i o n s                    
Of the Law on Privatization       31.5 
N= 603 
 
Major Violations                       
Of the Law on Privatization       62.5 
 N= 592   
Percent “Yes” or “more or less yes” responses.  Yes response indicates that the courts should review 
the privatization.  Higher scores mean less legitimacy. 
N = number of responses. 
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A comparison of the responses in Tables 1 and 2 provides slightly more detail.   Consider 
the worse case scenario reported in the lower right corner in Tables 1 and 2. In this instance, 
managers have neither used the asset well nor provided public goods for the region.  Increasing the 
severity of the violations of the Law on Privatization from minor to major raises the percentage of 
respondents who said that privatization should be reviewed from 36.2 to 71.8 percent in this 
scenario.  This increase of more than 35 percentage points marks a substantial decrease in the 
perceived legitimacy of property rights and is strong evidence in support of the original sin 
argument.  Similar increases are reported in each of the other conditions as well.    
Two main results emerge from these analyses. First, controlling for other factors the severity 
of the violations of the Law on Privatization had a strong impact on perceptions of the legitimacy of 
property rights.  In three of the four scenarios, the number of respondents who thought that the 
state arbitration courts should review the privatization doubled when the violations of the Law on 
Privatization were major.  
On the positive side, these results indicate that the formal law influences the perceptions of 
business managers in Russia.  The prevailing wisdom is that businesspeople in Russia pay little 
attention to formal rules, but the findings here suggest that violations of the Law on Privatization 
undermined the perceived legitimacy of property rights.  On the negative side, it suggests that 
privatizations that are perceived to be legally flawed bear a birth defect that endures. 
  These findings also suggest that rightholders are not powerless to change the security of 
their property rights.   Good works matter as well.   Managers who use an asset well or provide 
public goods can increase the perceived legitimacy of property rights.    
  In addition to the usual caveats about conducting survey research in a postcommunist 
setting, a number of potential limitations to these findings are in order. The survey experiment on 
privatization does not directly test whether the content of the law influences perceptions over the 
security of property rights.  A legally scrupulous privatization that gave all the assets to a single 
individual may be in compliance with the law, but still be seen as grossly unfair.   In reality, there is 
likely a fairly high correspondence between compliance with the privatization law and perceptions of 
the outcome of privatization, but this issue is not addressed directly here. 
  More importantly, the sample of respondents here are businesspeople rather than the 
population at large.  Caution is appropriate in translating these findings to the larger population.
19  
                                                           
19 I plan to repeat this survey experiment with the mass public in the fall of 2005. 19 
However, one might expect to find even greater support for the original sin argument among the 
mass populace who benefited far less from privatization than the respondents, and perhaps, less 
support for the good works argument.      
 
Public Goods and Property Rights 
 
The next section examines a behavioral implication of the argument by asking whether the 
provision of public goods is associated with more secure property rights as proxied by investment.   
Conventional economic wisdom would suggest no.  A ruble spent on an orphanage or public 
housing is a ruble not spent on investment in the firm.  The view of property rights offered here 
makes the opposite prediction.   The provision of public goods should be associated with higher 
levels of investment.   By providing public goods for the region firms can make their property rights 
more broadly accepted by the public and therefore less vulnerable to political attack.
20   Here the 
provision of public goods may be a means to reduce political risk by perhaps appeasing the governor 
or the public, and thereby make property rights more secure.
21 With less to fear from a political 
reversal of property rights, managers have heightened incentives to invest in their firm.   
To assess this claim, I analyze three measures of investment that serve as indicators for the 
security of property rights.   Respondents were asked whether managers made a significant new 
capital investment (such as a major renovation or construction project, purchase of new equipment, 
etc) in the last two years or intended to make a significant new capital investment in their firm in the 
coming year.   In addition, interviewers asked whether firms had built a new building in the last two 
years. These are tangible, long-term investments that indicate considerable confidence in the security 
of property rights.  Just over half of the respondents (55 percent) made a significant new capital 
investment in the last two years while almost forty percent of respondents were planning to do so in 
the coming year. Just over a quarter of respondents (26.4) had built a new building in the last two 
years.   
                                                           
20 Ideally, one would like individual data that identified firms whose privatizations were done with minor and major 
violations of the Law on Privatization, but this is not possible. 
21 Future research may seem to identify whether firms use public goods to buy the goodwill of the governor or the 
mass public.   20 
  Interviewers also asked respondents whether their firm provided a variety of public goods 
for the region, including support for educational and health institutions, aid to orphanages, 
pensioners and other forms of charity.
22  Seventy-one percent of respondents said that their firm 
took part in at least one such program.  Almost 40 percent of these respondents reported giving aid 
to health, education, cultural or sporting programs.  
 
Table 4.  Private Investment in the Firm and Public Goods 
 
  Percent Yes 
 
1. Made significant new capital investment in last 2 years 
 
 
54.9 
 
2. Plan significant new capital investment in coming year 
 
 
39.7 
 
3. Constructed new building in last 2 years 
 
 
26.4 
 
4. Provided public goods for region in last 2 years 
 
 
71.3 
In Row 2, the reported responses included “yes” or “more or less yes” responses. See Appendix II for  
question wording.  
 
Using multivariate analysis, I explore whether firms that provided public goods for the 
region invested at lower rates as conventional economic wisdom suggests, or at higher rates, as the 
argument made here suggests.   The dependent variable in Model 1 in Table 5 is the response to the 
question about whether firms had made a new investment in the last two years.   I use a probit 
                                                           
22 See Appendix A5 for the question wording.  The dummy variable treatment of public goods provision is crude, but 
asking for more precise information would likely have produced unreliable responses.  These responses are self-reported 
and therefore are likely biased upward as managers may have wanted to paint themselves in a positive light. 21 
estimation because the dependent variable takes one of two categories.  In addition to a dummy 
variable for firms that provided public goods for the region, I introduce controls for factors specific 
to the manager (age and education, and the perceived quality of the court system; perceived levels of 
trust) and factors specific to the firm (property type, membership in a business organization, 
profitability, access to credit; extent of competition, and  number of employees).  I also include 9 
dummy variables for economic sectors and 10 dummy variables for the region in which the firm was 
located.   
 
Table 5. Public Goods and Property Rights 
  New Equipment in the 
Last Two Years 
1 
New Building in last 
Two Years 
2 
Plan New Investment 
In Coming Year 
3 
 
Public Goods 
 
.47** 
(.15) 
 
.31** 
(.14) 
 
.43*** 
(.16) 
 
Courts 
 
 
-.07 
(.08) 
 
-.07 
(.08) 
 
-.06 
(.08) 
 
Trust 
 
 
.02 
(.10) 
 
.10 
(.10) 
 
.16 
(.10) 
 
Corruption 
 
 
-.07 
(05) 
 
.09 
(.06) 
 
-.01 
(.05) 
 
Privatized 
 
 
-.08 
(.15) 
 
-.05 
(.16) 
 
.09 
(.15) 
 
State-owned 
 
 
-.61** 
(.26) 
 
-.58** 
(.31) 
 
-.20 
(.28) 
      22 
Business 
Organization 
.32** 
(.14) 
.40** 
(.14) 
.11 
(.14) 
 
Profitability 
 
 
.37** 
(.10) 
 
.18 
(.11) 
 
.27 
(.10) 
 
Constant 
 
 
.56 
(.64) 
 
.84 
(.70) 
 
-1.21 
(.70) 
 
Prob >chi
2 
 
 
.0001 
 
.0000 
 
.0000 
 
Pseudo R
2 
 
 
.12 
 
.18 
 
.13 
 
N 
 
 
481 
 
481 
 
473 
Variables for Age and Education of the Manager, Firm size, Sector, Region, Access to Credit, 
Competition, included, not reported.  * = p<.10,  ** = p<.05, *** = p<01 
 
 
Results from Model 1 indicate that managers who provided public goods for the region were 
significantly more likely to have made a new capital investment in the last two years.
23  Confidence in 
courts was unrelated to past investment, as was firms having undergone privatization.  Firms that 
were members of business organizations and had many employees were more likely to be planning a 
new investment, while state-owned firms were less likely to invest.  
                                                           
23 I also ran the analysis using a dummy variable for each of the various types of public goods provision in each model.  
The most common form of public goods provision – providing aid for education, health, culture or sports – was 
consistently and positively associated with investment.   Other types of public goods provision provided inconsistent 
results.   23 
Model 2, which examines whether managers had constructed a new building in the last two 
years, yields a similar result.  The coefficient on PublicGoods is positive and significant indicating that 
public good providers were more likely to be planning to make a new capital investment in the 
coming year.  Finally, model 3 indicates that firms that provided public goods for the region were 
also significantly more likely to be planning to make a new investment in the coming year.       
Simulating the results suggests that when dummy variables are set at their modal categories and 
continuous variables are set at their means, a food processing firm in Smolensk that did not provide 
public goods had about a .61 probability of having bought new equipment in the last two years, a .37 
probability of having constructed a new building; and a .18 probability of planning a new investment 
in the coming year.   The figures for an identical firm that provides public goods for the region are 
.71, .44, and .26 respectively.   The results, which are reported in Table 6 below, are substantively as 
well as significantly important.  These results hold controlling for a range of firm-specific and 
manager-specific factors commonly associated with investment.   Moreover, they are consistent 
across three different measures of the security of property rights which gives greater confidence in 
the results.  Most important, these findings are at odds with standard economic logic, but are 
consistent with the more political view of property rights offered above. Perhaps doing goods works 
are their own reward. 
 
Table 6. Simulation of Results  
 
 
 
 
No Public Goods 
 
Public Goods 
 
Bought New Capital 
Equipment 
 
.61 
 
.71 
 
Constructed New Building 
 
 
.37 
 
.44 
 
Plan to Buy New Capital 
Equipment 
 
.18 
 
.26 
This table reports the results of a simulation based on results from Table 5. The cells indicate the probability of buying 
new capital equipment, constructing a new building, and planning to buy new equipment when firms do and do not 
provide public goods, controlling for other factors.  
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Conclusion 
  Many studies examine the institutional, political, and social roots of property rights, but these 
works rarely examine how the manner in which property was obtained or the actions of rightholders 
influence the security of these rights.  These are critical questions for developing and transition 
countries where privatization is rarely transparent.   Using a survey of 660 businesspeople conducted 
in Russia in February 2005, this essay tests three theories of the perceived legitimacy of property 
rights.  It finds that the original sin of a legally dubious privatization continues to undermine the 
legitimacy of property rights even a decade after the transfer of assets from state to private hands.  
This is problematic as rightholders may perceive their ill-gotten assets as vulnerable to political 
attack and be reluctant to use their assets productively.  Most studies attribute the failure of private 
property to promote investment in developing and transition countries to weak formal or informal 
institutions (North 1990; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). This study suggests that the birth 
defect of a flawed privatization may have a similar effect. 
In addition, it finds that rightholders can significantly increase the perceived legitimacy of 
property rights by doing good works.  Rather than viewing rightholders as passively responding to 
institutional constraints, it suggests that they can shape the perceived legitimacy of their property 
rights.  This result introduces agency into a literature in which it has been largely absent. 
Moreover, behavioral evidence is consistent with the argument that firms use public goods 
provision as a form of political risk insurance to increase the security of their property rights.  In 
contrast to standard economic logic, firms that provide public goods for the region invest at higher, 
not lower, rates. This provides additional evidence that the behavior of firms can shape the security 
of property rights.      
  These results suggest that policymakers should pay considerable attention to the design of 
privatization programs because a lack of compliance with the formal rules of privatization may 
undercut the legitimacy of the transfer of property.  In addition, governments should encourage 
managers to do good works by investing in their firms and by providing public goods for their 
regions.  In combination, these actions can help managers increase the perceived legitimacy of their 
property rights.    25 
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APPENDIX: Survey Details 
 
The overall response was rate 53 percent for firms contacted by the interviewer.   As is not 
uncommon in business elite surveys conducted in Russia the city with the lowest response rate was 
Moscow (28 percent). Fully one-third of all refusals came from the capital city.   Absent Moscow the 
response rate increases to 62 percent. The analyses are unchanged if responses from Moscow are 
dropped from the sample.    Twenty percent of respondents were called back to ensure quality 
control.  Respondents were asked a range of questions about the legal and business environment.  
Many questions have been used in previous surveys and all surveys were pre-tested in pilot surveys.  
For comparison’s sake, response rates for the National Election Studies in the US in 2000 was 60 
percent. 
 
 
Cites in the Sample 
 
Moscow 
Nizhnii Nivgorod 
Volgograd 
Smolensk 
Novgorod 
Ekaterinburg 
Voronezh  
Rostov 
Ufa 
Khabarovsk 
Tula 
Omsk 
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Table A1. Businesses by Sector 
 
Sector  
 
Number of Businesses Percentage of All Firms in Survey
Construction  120 18% 
Machinery  120 18% 
Retail  67 10% 
Food Processing  64 9.6% 
Transportation  47 7.1% 
Light Industry  45 6.8% 
Wholesale  33 5% 
Communications  26 3.9% 
Forestry  26 3.9% 
Publishing  19 2.9% 
Metallurgy  16 2.4% 
Chemical  14 2.1% 
Electric  15 2% 
Bank  12 1.8% 
Bldg. Materials  11 1.7% 
Insurance  10 1.5% 
Medical  6 .9% 
Real Estate  5 .8% 
Grain  3 .5% 
Investment  2 .3% 
Commercial firm  2 .3% 
Fuel  2 .3% 
Glass   1 .2% 
Oil  0 0% 
Total  666 100% 
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Table A2. Mean Employment by Sector 
 
Sector Full-time  Part-time 
Electric  
N=15 
6427 7205 
Fuel 
N=2 
4375 4550 
Machinery 
N=120 
708 731 
Metallurgy 
N=16 
954 1415 
Chemical 
N=14 
504 533 
Forestry 
N=26 
173 173 
Bldg. Materials 
N=11 
391 435 
Glass 
N=1 
270 270 
Light Industry 
N=45 
237 250 
Medical 
N=6 
596 584 
Food Processing 
N=64 
253 269 
Grain 
N=3 
74 90 
Publishing 
N=19 
217 188 
Construction 
N=120 
204 183 
Transportation  3533 2159 31 
N=47 
Communications 
N=26 
820 302 
Wholesale 
N=33 
114 98 
Retail 
N=33 
127 110 
Bank 
N=12 
207 159 
Insurance 
N=10 
87 51 
Investment 
N=2 
9 9 
Real Estate 
N=5 
55 51 
Commercial Firm 
N=2 
24 20 
 
 
Table A3. Legal Organization of the Firms 
 
 
Percent  
(raw numbers) 
 
State Owned (gup) 
 
11%  (69) 
Company (ooo)  33%   (219) 
 
Open Joint Stock (oao)  33%   (223) 
 
Closed Joint Stock (zao)  18%   (122) 32 
 
Municipal ownership    2%   (16) 
 
Private Company without  
(pbyul) 
2%   (16) 
  
Other  1%   (5) 
 
Table A4. Descriptive Statistics of Firms in the Samples 
 
 Firm Characteristics  Responses 
 
 
Average number of employees 
 
727 
 
Median number of employee 
 
125 
 
Industrial firms 
 
58% 
 
Retail and wholesale trading firms 
 
15% 
Construction/Transport/ 
Communications firms 
 
29% 
 
Members of business organization 
 
37% 
 
Average age of the manager (yrs) 
 
47 
 
College Degree 
 
90% 
 
Privatized firm 
 
59% 
 
State-owned firm 
 
12% 33 
 
Denovo private firm 
 
29% 
 
No competitors 
 
7% 
 
Competition from foreign firms 
 
7% 
Member of production 
association, trust, holding 
 
24% 
 
Profit in preceding year 
 
69% 
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Table A5.  
Public Goods Question 
Did your firms provide any social programs designed to help promote the development of the 
region in the last two years? If so, what types of assistance was provided? 
                         Y e s   ( % )  
 
1.  Did not take part in any programs to help develop the region   27 
2.  Aid for education, health, culture or sports        38 
3.  Temporary assistance for the unemployed        6 
4.  A i d   f o r   o r p h a n a g e s         1 1  
5.  Aid for pensioners or other socially vulnerable categories    3 
6.  Build  public  housing        4 
7.  Participate  in  ecological  programs      2 
8.  C h a r i t y           9  
9.  O t h e r           1  
 
 
Table A6.  
New Investment Question 
Is your firm planning to make a significant new capital investment, (such as a major renovation or 
construction project, purchase of new equipment, etc) in your firm in the coming year? 
 
       (%) 
 
N o        3 8 . 6     
Most Likely No    21.7 
Most likely Yes     17.7 
Yes     22.0 
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